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Abstract
Today it is possible to buy small and cheap drones in toy stores, super markets, and on numerous online shops. Often,
these drones are very light-weight and are flown in back yards, sport fields, parking lots, and such places. They typically
pose no lethal threat to people in the vicinity of the drone. Nonetheless, in many countries such drones are regulated
by aviation rules that does not (sufficiently well) distinguish between these drones and the larger hobby or professional
drones. Consequently such small drones are flow illegally. This has prompted some national aviation authorities to
consider a form of ’harmless’ category, which ideally should be based on a mass threshold. To aid such a classification
this work proposes a mass threshold of 250 gram, below which, we argue, it is reasonable to classify drones as
’harmless’ in the sense that the expected fatality rate is equivalent to that of manned aviation.
In this work we combine a series of models and methods to provide a foundation for giving a mass threshold. The
approach is probabilistic and focuses on the relation between mass and human injury in the case of small drones. The
approach is also parameterized such that readers can substitute other probabilities and conduct their own calculations,
possibly determining a different mass threshold.
Keywords
Drone, unmanned aircraft, threshold, UAS category, harmless
Introduction
Introducing new legislation for unmanned aircraft is a
worldwide challenge that national aviation authorities in
most countries find difficult and time-consuming. This
comparatively new area within aviation is in many aspects
different from manned aviation, and therefore requires new
regulation. One such difference is the size and weight of the
aircraft; once unmanned an aircraft can become arbitrarily
small. As a consequences it makes sense to divide the
unmanned aircraft into size categories and impose less
stringent requirements on comparatively smaller categories.
One interesting category is the ’no harm’ size, which is
loosely defined as aircraft that cannot do harm to people
through physical interaction (except intentionally through
chemicals, explosives, and other such means). For aircraft
of this size it would not be necessary to consider the safety
measures that otherwise apply to drones, making them much
easier to manufacture and operate as well as making the
regulation easier to enforce. This work investigates what
would be a proper criteria for a ’harmless’ category.
Since this work is addressing specifically the very small
unmanned aircraft that popularly are called ’drones’ this
term is also prevailing in this work. Most of the referred
literature would use UAS (unmanned aircraft system) or
RPAS (remotely piloted aircraft system), a subset of UAS.
Some literature also use now obsolete UAV (unmanned aerial
vehicle).
Background
This work was prompted by growing desire from national
and international regulators to have a mass threshold below
which it would be reasonable to significantly relax regulatory
restrictions without compromising public safety. That is, a
’no harm’ threshold in the sense that drones below this mass
in all probability would not cause severe or fatal injuries
under any circumstances.
It seems justified that such a threshold do exist; large
drones obviously can be lethal on impact, while tiny drones
(say, less than 1 gram) does not pose any direct threat to
human safety. The challenge is to find a threshold where we
pass from the latter situation to the former.
The fast development in miniaturization and low-cost
manufacturing of simple consumer electronics means that
drones are now available to everybody through toy vendors,
super markets, ’add to basket’ web sites, etc. The national
aviation regulations are typically not updated at the same
fast pace and consequently, when people operate very small
toy drones in their back yards they might inadvertently
violate regulations even though the drone probably could be
categorized as ’harmless’. Being unable to – and generally
not interested in – limiting this widespread use of toy drones
civil aviation authorities might introduce the ’harmless’
category to legalize at least the smaller of these aircraft.
Recognizing that although a limit on the mass of a drone
is very easy to enforce (in the sense that determining the
mass of a drone is easy) determining a meaningful threshold
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value is perhaps not so easy. From a safety point-of-view the
threshold should be sufficiently low to reduce the probability
of fatalities to almost zero. But the large variety of drone
designs will then inevitably lead to a fairly or even very
conservative limit for a significant part of the drone types.
However, since combining only worst case scenarios will
lower the limit to the point where it is no longer useful
this work will instead propose a mass threshold based on
probabilities.
Previous work
Classification
Categorization or classification of unmanned aircraft has
been the subject of previous publications and is part of many,
if not all, national regulations for unmanned aircraft. Indeed
most such regulations categorize aircraft according to mass,
for instance using 1.5 kg, 7 kg, 20 lbs, 20 kg, 55 lbs, 25
kg as thresholds. A harmless drone would normally be (at
least) in the lowest mass class, but given that the threshold
for this class varies by two orders of magnitude between
classification schemes (see below) it is also evident that a
’smallest’ class does not automatically imply any reasonable
interpretation of ’harmless’.
National regulation classifications Most national regula-
tions invoke mass classifications in order to have different
regulatory requirements applied to different size drones.
Some national regulations have several classes while others
have few. Australian regulation Government of Australia
(2016a) and Government of Australia (2016b) classifies
’very small RPA’ to be drones between 100 g and 2 kg and
’micro RPA’ to be drones less than 100 g. The class ’micro
UAV’/’micro RPA’ has existed in Australia since 1998 and
drones in this class is largely exempted from regulation
that governs larger drones. The author has been unable to
determine the origin of the 100 g and 2 kg limit. United
Kingdom Safety and Airspace Regulation Group Unmanned
(2015) has ’Small Unmanned Aircraft’ at less than 20 kg
(the reasoning for this threshold is ’historic developments
in manned aviation’) as well as a ’UAS Operating Safety
Case’ class at less than 7 kg. France ministre de l’écologie
du développement durable et de l’énergie (2015) has ’D cat-
egory’ at less than 2 kg. Denmark Ministry of Transport and
Building (2016) and Sweden Transportstyrelsen (2009) both
have ’category 1A’ at less than 1.5 kg (with the additional
Swedish requirement of less than 150 J). New Zealand Civil
Aviation Authority of New Zealand (2015a,b,c,d) has ’Small
unmanned aircraft’ at less than 25 kg (plus an unnamed
class up to 15 kg). Canada Transport Canada (2012) has an
unmanned aircraft class for less than 25 kg (as well as a
’model aircraft’ class of less then 35 kg) with exemption for
less than 2 kg. Canadian authorities are considering using
the same threshold for a ’very small UAS’ class, which
alternatively may be based on surface energy density at
(proposed) less than 12 J/cm2 Transport Canada (2015);
this threshold is equal to the proposed ’Micro UAS’ class
in Fraser and Donnithorne-Tait (2011) (also of Canadian
origin). Switzerland Das Eidgenössische Departement für
Umwelt Verkehr Energie und Kommunikation (2015) has
a class of less than 30 kg (with limited liability insurance
requirements for less than 500 g). NASA Maddalon et al.
(2013) has ’category I’ at less than 25 kg (and less than 36
m/s).
Additional classifications US Department of Defense U.S.
Army UAS Center of Excellence (2010) uses ’small’ for
drones at less than 25 kg and refers to approximately 1 lb
as ’micro’. UK Ministry of Defense Ministry of Defence
(2010) uses ’micro’ for less than 2 kg. The UVSI Yearbook
UVS International (2009) had ’micro’ (less than 5 kg) as the
smallest class until 2008, where ’nano’ class was introduced
with a threshold at 250 g. The yearbook does not offer
an explanation for this choice of threshold. In Lacher and
Maroney (2012) ’very small UAS’ is listed as less than 1.5
lb. In Weibel and Hansman (2004) the micro class is ’less
than 1 lb’ and in Weibel and Hansman (2005) ’less than 2
lb’. In Watts et al. (2012) ’small UAS’ means ’typically 2-
5kg’, while micro is taken to mean ’size [that fits] individual
soldiers backpacks’. The Micro Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Aviation Rulemaking Committee Micro Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee (2016) defines
a ’Category 1’ of less than 250 gram and a category 2
of ’a maximum risk impact threshold of a 1% chance
of AIS level 3 or greater injury, based on kinetic energy
transfer at impact.’ The committee will allow aircraft in
category 1 to conduct ’operations over people’ solely based
on mass. The threshold originates in Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Recommendations Registration Task Force Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (2015), which stresses that this
’weight threshold [is] for registration purposes only’, and
thus does not (necessarily) constitute a ’harmless’ threshold.
The task force arrived at 250 gram through a fairly simple
computation that assumes a very low person density on
the ground, a rather high drone reliability, and a high
impact velocity (based on free fall rather than propelled
flight) and consequently a (compared to the present study)
somewhat higher probability of fatality upon impact. Weibel
and Hansman (2005) calculates that an ’MTBF [mean time
between failure] of 100-10.000 hours’ will result in a fatality
rate of at most 10−7 per hour for flights anywhere in the US.
This is based on a single formula using MTBF, population
density, and an example drone of 63 g with an front area of
241 cm2 and shelter penetration probability of 5%. In Fraser
and Donnithorne-Tait (2011) a class called ’Harmless UAS’
is suggested for drones of less than 80 gram. This is partly
based on assumptions equivalent to a kinetic impact energy
of 33.9 J. The threshold is derived from an extrapolation of
data from drones in the mass span 0.5 to 1000+ kg, that is, the
aircraft used to derive the harmless threshold is one to five
orders of magnitude heavier than the threshold. Fraser and
Donnithorne-Tait (2011) does also states that no formal study
exist to determine an appropriate threshold for the ’nuisance
class’ and that it is ’unclear whether 200 g or even 500 g are
necessarily more dangerous [than 80 g]’.
Ground casualty risk
As a small drone by definition is not carrying any people any
human injury associated with a drone crash must necessarily
be humans at the location where the drone impacts the
ground (or grounded objects). Consequently, the probability
of fatalities is closely related to probability of impacting
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persons. This probability has two main components; density
of people at the crash site and probability of the drone to
impact one or more persons in a more or less harmful way.
The former probability can generally be determined fairly
accurately for a given geographical area where the people
density is known and fairly homogenous Range Safety Group
Risk Committee (2007); Wu and Clothier (2012). The latter
probability has been subject of some research. In King et al.
(2005) the probability of impacting people is investigated
using a falling debris model and in Cole et al. (1997) different
body parts and different body postures are considered along
with different debris impact angles using the BC criterion.
Drone reliability
Reliability is the probability of a drone to behave according
to specifications. This parameter is a vital component in a
risk analysis since it describes how much the drone can
be trusted, on average, to not experience malfunctions that
may create hazardous situations. Reliability can be quantified
by as little as a single figure for the entire system to a
detailed description of individual component reliability and
their inter-dependence. Being a fairly recent technology the
empirical information on reliability of smaller civilian drones
is somewhat limited, so a quantification of reliability for
such drones must to a large extend rely on component
analysis. This can be done with methods such as fault
tree analysis (FTA), failure modes and effects analysis
(FMEA), or functional hazard assessment. Often, such
methods require information on component reliability which
typically is not available for smaller hobby grade drones,
where the components never have been subjected to a
rigorous reliability study.
There does exist some literature on various approaches to
quantify reliability of smaller civilian drones. Considerations
on what would constitute a sufficiently reliable delivery
drone are presented in Schenkelberg (2016). A group of
students Reimann et al. (2014) has conducted a reasonably
detailed investigation into the reliability of a specific
small RC model aircraft, an Ultra Stick 120, a 4-5 kg
aircraft, concluding a MTBF around 50 flight hours. And
in Venkataraman et al. (2015) using the same aircraft stuck
actuators are investigated both in terms of consequence
and probability. Actuation failure modes are investigated in
Freeman and Balas (2014) using FMEA (also using the Ultra
Stick 120 at 7.4 kg).
Human injury
Drone inflicted injuries Laback et al. (2013) provide
examples of the severity of close encounters with RC model
planes, in particular larger models. The exemplified injuries
are largely associated with ground handling rather than
impact during flight. A study on the effect of helicopter
toy drone blades on human eyeballs Alphonse et al. (2012)
found that at least for smaller blades the effect is negligible.
Five models with tip speeds up to 25 m/s were tested and
apart from corneal abrasions, no injures were observed. For
medium sized helicopters (65 cm rotor diameter) the eye
injury resulting from impact with a dislodged rotorblade at
full speed can cause full rupture of the eye ball resulting in
immediate and permanent loss of sight Lee et al. (2009).
A study with an airworthiness certification perspective
Magister (2010) looks at less than 15 kg aircraft, and applies
the empirically based blunt (ballistic impact) criteria (BC)
from Bir and Viano (2004) to relate aircraft mass to injury
severity. BC is basically kinetic energy relative to impact
area, mass of impact object and thickness of the body wall
of the target. Radi (2013) develops a model based on the BC
to predict severity of blunt drone impacts, and based on this
makes some recommendations on drone design as well as
concluding that 400 g at 15 m/s (40 J) is the limit for ’severe
injuries’. According to Burke (2010) a mass threshold of 2
lb and kinetic energy threshold of 66 J ’can be considered
nonlethal’. This is based primarily on Range Commanders
Council (2001) and Lyo et al. (1999).
Drone-like injuries Injuries resulting from impacts with
smaller objects have been analyzed and studied for decades.
This includes bullets from smaller weapons, fragments from
explosions Feinsteain et al. (1968); Henderson (2010), debris
from accidents Cole et al. (1997); Longinow et al. (1976);
Robinson et al. (2013), less-lethal projectiles Widder et al.
(1998); Lyo et al. (1999); Bir (2000); Bir and Viano (2004);
Koene and Papy (2011), melee weapons, both sharp and
blunt, behind armor trauma Bass et al. (2006), and impact
injuries in baseball, hockey, lacrosse Maron et al. (1995). A
good overview of the biomechanics of chest and abdomen
impacts is Viano and King (2008).
A few relevant key points arise from the body of
research into impact-related human injuries. In relation to the
challenge at hand perhaps the most important observation is
that mass and kinetic energy are generally poor indicators
of injury severity, that the human body reacts differently
depending on the impacted body part, and that injuries
only relate to the kinetic energy dissipated in the body, not
the kinetic energy of the impacting object. A number of
more accurate and empirically verified models have been
developed. One model that fits well to a drone (chest) impact
scenario is Viano and Lau (1988) which uses a lumped-mass
thoracic model to develop a VC parameter, where V is thorax
compression velocity and C is compression relative to chest
depth. The VC parameter for a given impact maps well to
injury severity. Another model is the blunt criterion (BC)
Clare et al. (1975) defined as
BC = ln
E
W 1/3TD
, (1)
where E is kinetic energy, W is mass of impacted object, T
is thickness of the body wall, andD is diameter of impacting
object. The BC value maps directly to injury severity Bir and
Viano (2004). An adaption of BC to impacts of drones is
done in Radi (2013), where a generic drone design is used to
develop formulas specifically for thorax and head impacts.
Present work
This work focuses on identifying an actual probability of
a drone being harmful to humans given the mass and with
all other parameters being equal. The probability model for
fatalities is a combination of probabilities for the events
leading to an injury and the injury mechanics. Each of
these probabilities are extracted from a variety of sources
and combine with a short survey of very small drones (to
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determine typical mass and speed relations). The novelty
in this work is determining an actual mass threshold that
with the present body of scientific work available can with
reasonable confidence be labelled ’harmless’. Although a
number of sources report different thresholds in 2 or 3 digit
grams, and some indeed recommends 250 gram, it is mostly
either peripheral results from a study of larger drones, or
relatively simple computations that does not account for the
particulars of very small drones.
Regulatory application
During the early phases of the preparation for the now
present law on drones in Denmark the Danish Transport
and Construction Agency (DTCA) wanted to include the
’harmless’ category with the expressed intend to relax the
regulatory constraints to allow toy drones to be used similar
to other toys (i.e. no need for registration, education, and
other such measures) as well as allow very small commercial
drones to operate more freely. Since a large part of the
target audience for such a category is people without any
training or relation to aviation the threshold must be very
easy to understand and to check. So despite the scientific
arguments against a mass-based threshold and the ’worst
case’ arguments against any specific threshold the DTCA
embraces it as a pragmatic solution to a challenging problem.
Existing national regulations (and the associated guidelines)
in some other nations indicate at least implicitly that this
view is shared by a number of national aviation authorities.
For Denmark the harmless threshold was first officially
endorsed in a report published by DTCA in March
2015 Trafikstyrelsen (2015) to outline future Danish
regulation. It specifically recommends 250 gram as a
’harmless threshold’ (page 8, recommendation ’a’) based on
the research presented here. This has been carried through
to bill L132 Danish Parliament (2016) (a revision of Danish
aviation regulation to accommodate professional operations
of drones) where the option for a harmless mass threshold
is included in section 126b subsection 4. The threshold did
not carry through to the final Act due to privacy concerns,
but there is an option for the threshold to be reinstated later
through ministerial decree.
In a technical opinion from EASA (European Aviation
Safety Agency 2015, p. 19) (a precursor to actual European
regulation) a ’harmless’ subcategory is proposed, due to
numerous requests from the drone community, as Proposal
11 to accommodate ’toy aircraft or nano drones that cannot
cause serious injuries or significant damage’, and with a
reference to a preprint of this work 250 gram is listed as a
suitable limit.
The ’Drone Collision’ Task Force under EASA in its
final report European Aviation Safety Agency (2016) adapts
a 250 gram threshold for their smallest category, stating
that "A [midiar] collision with the smallest drone category
[harmless] ]is expected to be harmless, [...], at least for large
aeroplane product types." A preprint of this work is listed as
reference in this report.
Methods
This section is divided into four parts. The first part is the two
subsection presenting the basic and simplifying assumptions
used to determine the threshold. The second part presents
the probabilistic methods used. The third part explains the
relation between kinetic energy and human injury, and how
to find an appropriate kinetic energy threshold. Finally, the
fourth part is on establishing the mass threshold from a
kinetic energy threshold.
Basic assumptions
The development of a mass threshold will be based on a
number of assumptions, divided into two categories. The
basic assumptions which in some sense are circumstantial to
the investigation, and the simplifying assumptions described
in the next sections. The basic assumptions are listed here
and are unchanged throughout this work. They serve to frame
the problem and described the circumstances under which
the threshold is meant to have effect.
Upper limit: It is assumed that the mass threshold is at most
500 gram, and as such the list of drones forming the
basis of the statistical analysis will exclude any drones
above 500 gram maximum take-off mass (MTOM).
Indirect injury: The probability of a fatality Pfatality is
solely based on impact between a drone and a human
being. Injuries resulting from incidents caused by a
person’s lack of attention for their own well-being
when observing a drone are not included. Injuries
resulting from subsequent actions following a drone
incident (for instance a drone breaking a window and
glass falling down) are also not included.
Air-to-air collisions: As a consequence of the above
assumption mid-air collisions are not considered.
Awareness: It is assumed that people are not aware of the
presence of a drone. It is not assumed that people will
attempting to avoid a drone coming at them, or attempt
to take cover.
Multiple person injury: It is assume that a drone is not
large enough to injure multiple people simultaneously,
or to impact an obstacle and a person simultaneously.
That is, it is assumed that any energy dissipated at
impact goes into one human.
Shelter: It is assumed that people are not sheltered in any
form, neither by walls, fences, or even clothes.
Body regions: It is assumed that a person is impacted either
in the head, thorax, or abdomen. These are typically
the exposed body parts in most posture, and injury to
arms and legs are typically not fatal.
Fatal injuries: Only fatalities are considered. That is, non-
fatal injuries, including bleeding, pain, disabling
injuries and similar are not considered.
Simplifying assumptions
To be able to quantify the probability of fatal injuries we will
make a number of simplifying assumptions. In future work
these might be detailed, replaced, or altogether removed to
achieve a more accurate quantification.
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Kinetic energy: It is assumed that kinetic energy of a
drone is reasonable measure for person injury upon
impact. This is a key assumption which will help
introduce the mass threshold. However, it is not
difficult to realize that this is a severely simplifying
assumption, and future work might very well focus on
removing/replacing this.
Deformation: The drone is assumed to be completely rigid
and not deform upon impact. All deformation occurs
in the tissue, and as such the dissipation of energy is in
the person only.
Propellers and rotor: While most drones are equipped
with exposed rotating propeller(s) or rotor(s) we will
assume that they do not constitute a lethal threat nor
contribute to the injury.
Speed: A drone can either impact through flight speed or
through ballistic speed. The latter typically occurs for
rotary winged drones when propulsion is lost and it
moves solely through the influence of gravity and
wind. While a falling drone might attain high speed,
in this work the assumption is that impact occurs at
the top flight speed of the drone.
Probability of lethal incidents
The ultimate goal is to determine a mass such that it is
improbable for a drone below this mass to inflict fatal injuries
to any person under any circumstance. Obviously it is not
possible (on the long term) to completely avoid fatalities,
and it would therefore be reasonable to accept a fatality
rate in the same order of magnitude as manned aviation.
This is a widely accepted concept termed equivalent level of
safety Haddon (2009); King et al. (2005); International Civil
Aviation Organization (2011).
Different sources report different fatality rates for manned
aviation, but they general range from 10−7 to 10−8 fatalities
per flight hour Clothier and Walker (2013); Weibel and
Hansman (2004). Some figures are based on statistics from
actual incidents, others on recommendations for manned as
well as unmanned aviation. In Range Commanders Council
(2001) 10−6 is specifically given as acceptable threshold,
stating that ’casualty expectation must be less than one
casualty in a million flight hours’. There is no significant
difference between the ground fatality rates and the mid-air
collision fatality rates. In this work we will assume that 10−7
fatalities per flight hour is acceptable.
The probability can be quantified as a product of a series
of probabilities
Pfatality = Pcrashing × Pimpact × Pfatal injury, (2)
where Pcrashing is the probability of the drone crashing
at (near) top speed, Pimpact is the conditional probability
of hitting a person in the crash, and Pfatal injury is the
conditional probability that an impact results in fatal injury.
Per tradition in aviation Pcrashing, and thus also Pfatality
has the unit ’per flight hour’. As argued above by adjusting
the drone mass the combined probability can be reduced,
and the challenge is therefore to find the mass such that
Pfatality is comparable to manned aviation. However, all
three probabilities are difficult to determine and obviously
highly situation-specific.
In order to quantify these probabilities with reference to
existing literature it is useful to further divide them
Pcrashing = Perror × Ploss of control × Phigh speed (3)
Pimpact = ρpeople ×Aperson (4)
Pfatal injury = Pinjury × Pinjury fatal (5)
where the individual factors express various parameters of
the flight. Each of the factors are described in a little more
detail in Table 1. This work will focus primarily on Pinjury
and Pinjury fatal because these are the parameters mostly
affect by a varying mass. The probabilities in (3) and (4)
will not be investigated in depth in this work, and will all
be assumed to be rather high. For any reader supplying their
own probabilities a number of scenarios are presented in
the results section where these probabilities can easily be
replaced to determine different fatality rates.
Injury mechanics
The following is a paraphrased and ’drone-adapted’
description from Cooper and Maynard Cooper and Taylor
(1989) of mechanics of person injury for a non-penetrating
impact: A rapid inward displacement is the primary
mechanical response of the body wall to the loading of an
impacting drone and this is the principal factor responsible
for the transfer of energy into the body and the production
of internal injury. The maximum displacement produced and
the velocity attained in the early stages of the motion are the
primary parameters for the extend of the injury. Subsequent
to impact and the following rapid deformation of the body
wall the drone will have negligible rebound velocity and
the body wall returns only very slowly to its original shape.
The drone simply distorts the body wall and falls down.
That is, the thoracic or abdominal wall is not acting like
a spring being compressed and then releasing the kinetic
energy back to the drone. The lack of significant rebound
velocity shows that the body is highly damped or ’viscous’.
This is a significant observation in that for a system having an
elastic and viscous behavior (viscoelastic), the displacement
upon impact loading is velocity dependent. The faster that
a viscoelastic material is deformed, the more resistance it
offers (it becomes stiffer). This behavior is broadly similar
to that of a car suspension; a slow push will depress the
suspension but the shock absorber stiffens the suspension to
severe blows during driving. Thus, the type and severity of
internal injury is dependant not only upon the magnitude of
the distortion of the body wall, but also upon the velocity at
which distortion occurs.
Importance of drone design The human torso can
withstand rather severe compressions without sustaining
significant injury. In fact, as much as 50% reduction in
body dimensions can be sustained in the direction of
the applied force, provided that the peak velocity of the
distortion occurs at least 50 milliseconds after impact.
Conversely, high velocity distortions occurring at least ten
times faster can produce severe internal injury even with
body wall distortions of only 3-4 cm Cooper and Maynard
(1986). This means that temporal extension of the impact
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Table 1. Short description of the factors in the probability equations, and the ranges used in this work.
Factor Description Range
Perror The probability of an error, either piloting error or technical malfunction. We will assume
this to be fairly high for the smaller drones, and decrease with increasing size. The unit
for this value is ’per hour’.
0.5− 10
Ploss of control The probability that the error leads to permanent loss of control of the drone. Piloting
error often causes temporary loss of control, while technical errors, such as empty battery
or loss of communication typically lead to permanent loss of control. In this work we will
assume a fixed value of 50 %.
0.5
Phigh speed The probability that loss of control leads to the drone traveling at near top speed. This
includes free fall from higher altitudes as a consequence of loss of power, while loss of
communication typically does not result in high speed crash. For this work we will
assume a rather high probability of 50%.
0.5
ρpeople Whether a crashing drone will impact a person depends hugely on the person density in
the vicinity of the drone. This is the probability that can be regulated by requiring drones
to fly some distance from roads, buildings, crowds, etc. The density can range from
vanishing to about 4 persons/m2 (large crowds at public events Oberhagemann (2012)).
For this work we will assume a fairly high density of 1 person per 10 m2 given that we
focus on smaller drones that often are used close to other people. Note that compared to
other studies such as Unmanned Aircraft Systems Recommendations Registration Task
Force Aviation Rulemaking Committee (2015) this is a very high density.
0.1
Aperson The average size of a person and the drone combined, as seen from above. For
predominantly horizonal impact trajectories the value might increase, but only slightly,
since we assume impact in either head, thorax, or abdomen.
0.25− 0.6
Pinjury The probability that a drone impacting a person actually causes an injury, which in this
context is equal to the probability that a drones below the mass threshold will still exceed
the kinetic energy threshold. This value varies greatly as a function of mass, but will
always be below 1.
< 1
Pfatal injury The probability that an injury result in a fatality. This depends on the properties of the
impact object, the person being impacted (adult or child, heavy or lightly clothed etc),
posture of the person (stand, sitting, crouching, etc), impact point on the body (i.e. chest is
much worse than shoulders). This probability is derived from previous works in the field
of medicine, and is an average over a variety of non-sheltered persons in various postures.
10−3
is very important, and that prolonging the period of energy
dissipation can greatly reduce the severity of the injury.
Therefore, if a drone is designed in such way that it takes
a long time (i.e. more than 50 ms) for the impact to peak,
typically by having a compressible front area, it can be
acceptable from a safety perspective to allow much higher
kinetic energy than for a completely rigid construction that
resembles a bullet when impacting.
Non-penetrating drones The injuries sustained by the
human body are rather different for skin penetration and
for crushing (non-penetrating) impacts. Skin penetration
typically occurs with high kinetic energy density (high
energy on a small impacting area), and in this work we will
assume that the drones are designed such that the kinetic
energy density is sufficiently low so that penetration will not
occur. However, this is not always the case, for instance if
a carbon fiber frame from a multicopter impacts a person in
the head where the skin is thin and there is no deformation of
underlying tissue. It should noted that the resulting bleeding
is rarely in itself lethal.
Kinetic energy threshold
The injury mechanics described above suggests that
deformation velocity of the tissue is the primary factor in
the severity of an impact injury. But the fact that this velocity
depends on properties of the impacting object as well as the
impacted region on a human it difficult to suggest a single-
parameter threshold. However, some methods do exist that
can be used to estimate Pinjury fatal. There are numerous
articles and reports that have investigated the fatality rate
for various types of impacts where kinetic energy is the
primary factor, and in this work we will primarily draw on
the following three methods to recommend an appropriate
kinetic energy threshold.
Debris impact criterion In Range Safety Group Risk
Committee (2007) it is concluded that a 25 ft-lb (33.9 J)
threshold is applicable for avoiding fatal injuries (AIS level
4, Abbreviated Injury Scale AAAM (2005)) from debris
impacts. This is in turned derived from lethality curves
by body parts presented in Feinsteain et al. (1968). To
avoid serious injuries (AIS level 3) altogether a 11 ft-lb
(14.9 J) threshold is recommended. This lower threshold for
determining injuries from falling and explosion debris is also
found in the FAA Flight Safety Analysis Handbook Federal
Aviation Administration (2011). These two thresholds are
to be interpreted as 1 percent threshold meaning that the
probability of sustaining a AIS level 3/level 4 injury is 1%.
The AIS level 3 and 4 injuries have in themselves a 10%
and (up to) 50% probability of being fatal, respectively Bir
(2000).
VC criterion The VC value can be determined a given
kinetic energy and given velocity Viano and Lau (1988).
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Assuming a thorax impact and that all kinetic energy E is
absorbed in the thorax we have that
E = cvd =
1
2
mv2 ⇔ d = mv
2c
, (6)
where c is a dashpot parameter in the range of 500 N/(m/s), v
is impact velocity, d is displacement of impacted chest area,
andm is mass of impacting object. Assuming further that the
acceleration a of the impacting object (and thus the chest) is
constant from initial velocity vi to zero velocity, we find that
VCmax = max
t>0
v(t)C(t)
= max
t>0
v(t)
∫ t
0
v(τ)dτ
= max
t>0
(vi + at)
(1
2
at2 + vit
)
= −3−
√
3
3
vi
a
≈ 0.42 vi−a .
Thus, maximum VC occurs after 42% of the total impact
event time, at which point v(t) = 0.58vi and d(t) =
0.51dmax. From (6) we now have
VCmax = 0.58vi · 0.51dmax = 0.3mv
2
i
2cD
=
0.3E
cD
, (7)
where D is the chest depth (normalizing factor to obtain C).
BC criterion The kinetic energy required for a given BC
value can be determine from (1). According to Sturdivan
et al. (2004) T = kW 1/3 with k = 0.6 for females and k =
0.7 for males, so
E = kW 2/3D expBC ,
and from the mapping AIS = 1.33 · BC+ 0.6 given by Bir
and Viano (2004) it is possible to map directly from AIS level
to kinetic energy, as
E = kW 2/3D exp
(AIS− 0.6
1.33
)
. (8)
Data set
In this work the data set is a series of toy drone randomly
selected from a number of vendor web sites. Only drones
below 500 g have been included, and even very small drones
are part of the set. Unlike the larger drones it is sometimes
difficult to find mass (except if you actually acquire and
weigh the drone), and it is often difficult to find the top speed.
The drones used here all have their mass listed among the
specs. Only in a few cases is the top speed listed, and it is
therefore estimated based on a variety of factors, primarily
commercial video of the drone in flight and the author’s first
hand experience with similar drones. It is noteworthy that
small drones built for high speed flight do exist, and they can
reach fairly high top speeds. Such specialized drones have
been excluded from this analysis since they do not represent
the majority of toy drones.
It would be preferable to use a data set that represents well
the range of toy drones being sold, but such data is not readily
available for the very small drones. However, if such a data
set should be available is it relatively easy to substitute this
into the model to produce more accurate predictions.
Table 2. List of 41 drones used as data set. The names are as
found on vendor website at the time of compiling the list.
Name Type Mass Speed
Parrot Bebop 2 Quadrotor 500 15
Parrot AR.Drone 2.0 Quadrotor 420 12
Parrot AR.Drone 2.0 Quadrotor 380 13
Lynxmotion Hunter 500 Quadrotor 365 13
E-Flite Blade CX 2 Coaxial 227 7
X25S Shuttle FPV Racing Quadrotor 198 14
Hubsan FPV Spy Hawk Fixed wing 180 12
Pantonma Quadrotor 135 11
CX-33W WiFi FPV Quadrotor 133 9
iPhone Flying Bomber Coaxial 106 5
Syma DRO Quadrotor 100 8
Raider XL Quadrotor 100 9
Latrax Alias Quadrotor 100 7
BLADE 180 QX HD RTF Quadrotor 95 5
E-Flite UMX Pitts S-1S Fixed wing 90 9
E-Flite UMX Carbon Cub Fixed wing 90 6
Silverlit Space Nova UFO single 80 4
E-Flite UMX Habu 180 Fixed wing 76 9
Parrot Swing Transition 75 5
E-Flite UMX Beast 3D Fixed wing 72 7
Parrot Mambo Quadrotor 65 8
Hubsan FPV X4 Plus Quadrotor 68 5
Hubsan X4 Cam Plus Quadrotor 50 5
FPV Drone F807 Quadrotor 40 6
Hobby Zone Duet RTF Fixed wing 38 4
Drone ST4 Quadrotor 35 4
Traxxas QR-1 Quadrotor 33 3
Hubsan X4 Pus Quadrotor 32 4
Hubsan X4 H108 Quadrotor 31 4
Dexterity X100 Quadrotor 29 4
E-Flite Blade MCX Micro Coaxial 28 2
Hubsan X4 Spider Quadrotor 25 3
Crazyflie Nano Quadrotor 19 2
Blade Nano QX RTF Quadrotor 17 2
Nano Quad CX-10D Quadrotor 16 3
FPV Drone Hawkeye Quadrotor 16 4
Hubsan X4 Quadrotor 15 3
Nano Quad CX-10A Quadrotor 15 2
Nano Quad CX-10C Quadrotor 14 3
Estes Proto X Nano Quadrotor 12 2
Proto X Nano-Sized Quadrotor 11 2
Modelling kinetic energy to mass relation
It is clear that especially for smaller drones there is no simple
relation between speed and mass, and that any function
mapping between these two parameters must necessarily
be rather complicated to accommodate for all the design
variables, or alternatively rather imprecise as it models only
the general principle of ’increasing mass results in increasing
speed’. Note that such a simple model may still be quite
accurate despite its imprecision. The lack of precision in
a more simple model can then be capture by assuming a
distribution around the model value. This is exactly what was
done in Fraser and Donnithorne-Tait (2011) where a power
model
vmax = am
b , (9)
with a positive power was used. For larger aircraft this seems
to capture well the general relation between mass and speed,
and we will assume that such a model also will be useful for
the very small drones, albeit with different parameter values.
The model (9) captures the average relation between mass
and speed, but does not account for the variation than drones
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at similar masses will have in top speed. We expect the speed
variations to grow with increasing mass and we will assume
that speed is normally distributed around the mean value. A
’running’ standard deviation is determined in the following
way
φn =
1
m
k+m−1∑
n=k
αmass,n (10)
σn =
√√√√ 1
m
k+m−1∑
n=k
(
αspeed,n − a(φn)b
)2
, (11)
where αmass,n and αspeed,n are the mass and speed of
drone n from the sorted data set as shown in Table 2.
Approximating this (φn, σn) set with a first order polynomial
will give a simple mass to standard deviation mapping.
Results
Kinetic energy threshold
Unfortunately, there is no simple measure for a kinetic
energy threshold that can be applied directly to drones.
Consequently, we adopt the approach of other works that
focuses on injury from debris as well as the VC and BC
criteria, and consequently use kinetic energy. Various sources
report varying thresholds for injury; we decided to use some
of the more well-documented sources. As a result a kinetic
energy threshold at 25 J is selected, and the assumptions it
that this threshold provides a Pinjury fatal = 10−3 probability
of lethal injury.
The sources reporting the above stated thresholds focus
on debris and fragments from various incidents, such as
explosions and other violent occurrences. These fragments
tend to be small and with high velocity (and thus having
a high kinetic energy density), and the method used for
deriving the thresholds would therefore tend to give a higher
threshold value when applied to drones. For this work we
will therefore use an intermediate kinetic energy threshold
of 25 J as the 1% threshold for AIS level 3 injuries, which is
turn has 10% probability of being fatal.
For a 25 J drone impact the VC criterion in (7) gives
VCmax = 3.75 · 10−4, which is four orders of magnitude
less than VCmax = 1, which is ’25% probability of severe
chest impact injury’. Using the BC criterion (8) for an AIS
level 1 injury and assuming a 60 kg female and an impacting
object with a circular impacting area of 2 cm
E = kW 2/3D exp
(AIS− 0.6
1.33
)
= 0.6 · 602/3 · 2 exp
(1− 0.6
1.33
)
= 24.8 ,
meaning that to sustain no more than a AIS level 1 injury
equivalent to ’minor injury’ and probability of death at close
to 0% the body must not be exposed to more than 24.8 J.
From kinetic energy to mass
The relation between mass and kinetic energy depends on the
velocity (squared), and therefore in order to establish a mass
threshold it makes sense to compare the mass and velocity
parameters for a series of typical drones. Only propelled
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Figure 1. Mass versus top speed for the drone in the data set.
The solid red curve is the power model, and the three dashed
red curves are the 1σ, 2σ, and 3σ curves. The three joule
curves at 14.9 J, 25 J, and 33.9 J are also shown.
top speeds are considered, and not terminal velocity of free
falling drones. It is reasonable to expect that the velocity of
drones in general increase with mass, i.e. larger drones tend
to have higher top speeds that smaller drones. We also expect
that it makes sense to talk about ’typical’ drones, i.e. 10 gram
drones tend to have top speeds around, say, 2 m/s, and 100
gram drones tend to have top speeds in the range 5 to 10
m/s, say. Under these two assumption we can establish the
probability that the top speed will be within certain limits for
a given mass by deriving the stochastic properties of a sample
set of typical drones.
The drones in the data set have been plotted in Figure 1
using a log scale on the mass axis (first axis) and a linear
scale for speed. Each dot represent one drone. It is the
assumption that the relation between mass (m) and propelled
top speed (vmax) follows the power model in (9) where a
and b are parameters to be determined through fitting to the
data set. In Figure 1 the solid red curve shows the model as
fitted to the data set using a least square metric. The fitting
parameters are a = 21.0 and b = 0.470. To determine the
dependency of the standard deviation on mass a ’running’
standard deviation is computed using (11) with m = 5. The
associated masses are computed with (10). A first order
polynomial is fitted, giving
σ(m) = 7.8m+ 0.94 . (12)
In the figure the three dashed red curves show 1, 2, and 3
times this standard deviation (1σ, 2σ, and 3σ). The 14.9 J,
25 J, and 33.9 J curves are also shown.
The probability Pinjury that we are seeking is the
probability that a drone is below the mass threshold and
above the 25 J threshold. If we assume that the drones mass
follows a uniform distribution on the log scale then
Pinjury(Threshold = τ) =
1
τ
∫ τ
0
1− CDF(√50
m
)
dm ,
(13)
where the CDF is the cumulative distribution function for
the normal distribution with mean equal to the model (9) and
standard deviation equal to (12). The value of this integral is
show in Figure 2. Table 3 lists Pinjury for selected masses as
determined by (13).
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Figure 2. Probability for a drone to be below the mass
threshold and above the 25 J kinetic energy threshold.
Table 3. Injury and fatal injury probabilities for selected mass
thresholds.
Threshold Pinjury
0.025 0
0.15 3.4 · 10−8
0.20 1.8 · 10−4
0.25 4.5 · 10−3
0.30 1.9 · 10−2
0.40 6.4 · 10−2
Mass threshold
Based on the results in the previous section it is now possible
to setup a number of scenarios for which the probability
of a fatality can be determined. A total of 8 scenarios are
presented in Table 4, each giving a value for Pfatality from
(2). The scenarios listed all have rather conservative values
for the probabilities not investigated in depth in this work.
It is documented in literature that Perror is in the order of
10−2 for drones around 10 kg and given that smaller and
cheaper drones are most likely somewhat less reliable the
numbers used here are 2-3 orders of magnitude larger. PLOC
and Phigh speed are not well documented in the literature, and
are consequently set rather high. Unless the drone is flying as
part of an event the people in the vicinity of the flight would
probably be bystanders or third persons not in anyway related
to the flight. Such people would rarely be closely spaced,
thus the value of 1 person per 10 square meters. The impact
area of a person is for small drones almost the same as the
area of the person (roughly 0.25 m2) and growing as the
drones become larger.
The values used in the scenarios may arguable be different
in a lot of circumstances, and it is easy for the reader to
substitute different values to accommodate other scenarios.
In particular, the reliability of the drone, expressed as
Pcrash may be significantly different for professional drones,
allowing for a higher mass and/or higher people density for
at given Pfatality.
It is important to note that Pinjury fatal = 10−3 carries the
implicit assumption that a drone with a kinetic energy higher
than 25 J in fact has an energy of no more than 25 J. This
means that fatality rates computed for drones with significant
probability of exceedingly the 25 J threshold (and thus with
a significant probability of having kinetic energy at 30, 40 or
even 50 J) is misleading. For the scenarios in Table 4 this is
primarily a concern for the ’At 400 g’ scenario, which shows
a deceptively low fatality rate. For the ’At 250 g’ scenario
the probability of exceeding 25 J is 14%, but drops to 2.8%
for the 33.9 J threshold. So, there is about 10% probability
that a 250 gram drone has kinetic energy between 25 J and
33.9 J. Since Pinjury fatal is in the order of 10−2 for 33.9 J
the fatality can be adjusted accordingly, and becomes 20 ·
10−7 instead of 7 · 10−7. For smaller masses this adjustment
quickly vanishes, and consequently the fatality rates for the
first four scenarios are much less affected.
The values in Table 4 indicates that a mass threshold of
250 gram will provide a sufficiently low fatality rate to match
a 10−7 criterion. While a slightly higher mass would still
fit the criterion it seems reasonable to also have in mind
that drones close to the threshold will face the same relaxed
requirements as drones well below the threshold. For drones
at 250 gram the fatality rate is 20 times higher than 10−7,
but drops off quickly for decreasing mass. Given that most
drones will be somewhat below the threshold 250 gram is
recommended by this author.
Discussion and Future Work
This work recommends a mass threshold for ’harmless’
drone to be 250 gram. This recommendation is based on
a long series of estimates and assumptions, many of which
may be altered to achieve a higher or lower threshold. Some
estimates are somewhat uncertain and could benefit greatly
from more in-depth investigations, and some assumptions
could be argued to be either very conservative or overly
optimistic as they are based on indications from other
literature or extrapolated from existing data to a perhaps
unreasonable extend. As such, further work might reveal a
different recommendation for a mass threshold.
Uncertainties
In order to produce an actual and well-founded recommen-
dation a number of assumptions were made and probabilities
were derived based on literature rather than statistics from
actual flight. This introduces some degree of uncertainty in
the final result, but hopefully the probabilities throughout
this work have on average been sufficiently conservative to
warrant a useful result. To aid future work the following is a
short discussion on some of the key questions that one could
ask.
What is the reliability really of a drone? The best way to
learn the reliability of a particular drone is to fly it. To achieve
a reasonably good statistical basis the drone should be used
in a typical context and flown for sufficiently many hours
to have a statistically significant result. Even for smaller
drones with a high error rate (Perror is expected to be high)
it takes a significant number of flight hours to establish a
5% or even 1% significance level. For larger more reliable
drones the flight hours needed could easily be in thousands.
This is certainly not unachievable eventually (some drones
have clocked 104 to 106 flight hours) and testing through
flight hours is indeed part of an ongoing discussion about
certification of drones. However, for most drones such flight
records are still far in the future.
In this work we rely on estimates based partly on estimates
for somewhat larger, though still hobby-like, drones, and
partly immediately observable reliability of existing toy
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Table 4. Examples of estimated probabilities for a number of scenarios. The first four are for drones with masses with uniform
distribution on a log scale between 0 and the given mass, while the last four are for drones at the given mass.
Mass Perror PLOC Phigh speed ρpeople Aperson Pinjury Pinjury fatal Pfatality
gram Per hour persons/m2 m2 Per hour
< 25 10 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.25 0 10−3 0
< 150 2 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.25 3.4 · 10−8 10−3 4.2 · 10−13
< 250 1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.25 4.5 · 10−3 10−3 2.8 · 10−8
< 400 1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.4 6.4 · 10−2 10−3 6.4 · 10−7
At 150 1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.25 2.4 · 10−6 10−3 1.5 · 10−11
At 200 1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.25 8.7 · 10−3 10−3 5.4 · 10−8
At 250 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.14 10−3 7.0 · 10−7
At 400 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.73 10−3 5.5 · 10−6
drones. In Table 4 the smallest drones are estimated to
experience an error every 6 minutes of flight. The reasoning
is that such small toy drones experience both pilot errors and
mechanical malfunctions all the time. For the largest drone
(up to 400 gram) we expected that on average there will be an
error every 1-2 flight hours. It stands to reason that the pilot
only makes few mistakes (disregarding an initial learning
period) with more expensive drones and that drones of that
size are significantly more mechanically and electronically
reliable.
How likely is it actually that a person is hit by a drone?
In this work the density of people on the ground is the
only factor in the probability equation to account for the
probability of impacting a person when a drone is crashing.
And the probability is fixed at 2% to 6%, a fairly conservative
estimate for most scenarios. This value indicates a ’loose’
gathering of people without a specific event (like people in
a park one a Sunday afternoon), a scenario that certainly
is realistic, but also often grossly conservative. Further,
one could argue that most intelligent pilots would fly their
larger drones at unpopulated areas until they are relatively
comfortable with its operations and reliability (after a
software upgrades, for instance). However, Pimpact is also
the only factor of the three in (2) which is not in any way
related to the drone itself. This makes it somewhat more
difficult to control, and thus the conservatism.
On top of this the basic assumption is that people are
unaware of the drone crashing, and therefore do not attempt
to avert the drone using arms or legs, cover their face or chest
with their arms, take a crouching or prone posture, or indeed
avoid the drone altogether. For situations where only people
that are directly or indirectly involved in the flight (pilot
and spectators) this is rather conservative, but for situations
where a broader gatehring of people are present, such as a
city streets and event crowds, one might expect the majority
of people to be completely ignorant of the presence of the
drone. In this case the person density is presumably a good
measure of the impact probability.
Is the data set representative? For this work only a small
sample set of drones is used, and as such the uncertainty
in the joule to mass relation is relatively high. A bigger
data set containing a wider variety of drones might reveal
different results, and push the mass threshold either way.
However, this is only true if drones with different top speed
than those used are added to the data set. That is, more drones
with higher top speed (relatively independent of mass) would
decrease the recommended mass threshold. That is, if smaller
drones are predominant in the market, and a representative
data set therefore would contain more smaller than larger
drones, this would not in itself change the recommended
mass threshold even though the average drone would be
fairly small.
The top speed of smaller drones can be difficult to
determine without actually measuring it during flight (using
for instance a radar or a camera system). Some drones do
have a top speed value specified, but since top speed is a
relatively uninteresting property for most smaller drones,
this specific value is often either missing or (probably)
estimated by the manufacturer or the vendor. This work
would certainly benefit from a more thorough investigation
into the actual mass and top speed relation, but it is hard to
do without actually acquiring a significant number of drones
and conduct the necessary test flights.
What about mid-air collisions? Aviation regulation today
does not permit unmanned aircraft (at least not the kind that
are of interest here) to operate in non-segregated airspace.
This is done by requiring drones to stay below a certain
altitude limit, typically 100 m or 400 ft. While this indeed
separates drones from the vast majority of manned aviation,
there are still very low altitude activities such as military
aircraft and search and rescue helicopters. Evidently there
is a risk of mid-air collision between a drone and a manned
aircraft, and there is arguably a significant probability of a
fatal outcome from such a collision. However, the mass of
the drone is of little significance in such accident scenarios
since even the smallest drones could cause significant
damage to a high speed aircraft or if ingested into a turbine
engine Fraser and Donnithorne-Tait (2011); Range Safety
Group Risk Committee (2007). Therefore, to avoid such
accidents operational restrictions is much more effective than
a mass threshold.
Alternative threshold
It is quite obvious that the shape of an impacting object
is crucial, and that there is great potential for designing
drones for which a threshold much higher than 25 J would
be appropriate. However, rather than having a dynamic
kinetic energy threshold it would probably be better to have
a restriction on the ’lethality’ of a drone by imposing a
threshold on the deformation velocity of a human body that
a given drone can inflict. While this is indeed somewhat
more difficult to determine than the mass of a drone (and
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certainly beyond the skills of any person acquiring a drone
from a toy store for recreational purposes) it is nonetheless
possibly for professional drone manufacturer to demonstrate
that their particular drone design is likely to not cause
tissue deformation velocities beyond a given threshold. A
recommendation for such a threshold and how to stay below
it is beyond the scope of this work.
Regulatory use
The 250 gram threshold is a compromise between numerous
conflicting interests, and as described above not really a good
measure for the lethality of a drone. But from a regulatory
point-of-view such a simple and easily measurable threshold
is straightforward to both implement and enforce. This
means that it can be used for regulating the use of drones
for the general population, without having to resort to
more difficult measures such as top speed, kinetic energy,
design etc. The ’harmless’ category fits well into a larger
framework of classifications of unmanned aircraft, where the
’harmless’ category naturally will have the least restrictions,
possibly even very few restrictions, to allow people to
legally fly recreationally without any knowledge of aviation
regulation. Numerous national aviation regulators as well as
the European regulatory processes have adopted the concept
of a harmless category, although the threshold for category
vary greatly. A few, including Denmark and EASA, are
considering the 250 gram limit as an appropriate value.
In order for the recommended threshold to apply it
is important to observe the assumptions listed previously.
Many of these will fit quite well with the intentions of
regulatory bodies, for instance the assumption that people
are not prepared for a drone impact. Other assumptions
might required limitations in the permitted use of ’harmless’
drones. For instance the assumption on people density in
the three scenarios might lead to the requirement that a
drone cannot be operated directly over crowds of people.
And the assumption that the toy drones are representative
for the average use, thus disregarding some small subsets of
all acquirable drones (such high speed specialized drones),
might lead to an additional requirement that high speed
drones are exempted from the ’harmless’ category.
Future work
There is a whole plethora of future work to be done within
the subject of drone inflicted injuries. Numerous topics have
been indicated above and it is easy to imagine several more.
For this author the focus will be on a much better knowledge
of the value of Pinjury (see Table 1). To that end the author
and his research team are currently constructing a catapult
to conduct actual impact test with smaller drones on human
body replicas (typically various pig body parts). This is done
in cooperation with medically trained researchers, including
forensic pathologies, to ensure proper injury evaluation.
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